Distress tolerance is associated with a range of psychopathology and risk-taking behavior. Current research suggests that the behavioral ability to persist at goal-directed behavior when distressed may be malleable. However, little is known about the contributing factors that underlie individual differences in distress tolerance. Trait urgency, or the tendency to act impulsively in the context of acute changes in affect, may predict distress tolerance because the prepotent response to avoid or remove an aversive state may undermine persistence. To date, most research has examined the role of negative urgency, a valenced subfactor of urgency, in relation to distress tolerance. However, the broad trait of urgency may be associated with a greater change in affect that precedes the inability to tolerate distress. The current study examined whether greater changes in negative affect was indeed a mediator in the relationship between trait urgency and behavioral distress tolerance. The effects of both positive and negative urgency on affect change were examined to investigate the potential contribution of the broader urgency trait. The results suggest that a greater change in negative affect over the course of a stressor mediated the association between both subfactors of urgency and distress tolerance. These findings suggest that trait urgency, regardless of valence, may be associated with experiencing greater changes in affect that ultimately undermine the ability to tolerate distress. These findings also highlight important components of distress tolerance that could inform behavioral interventions.
Distress tolerance is an individual difference factor that reflects a person's ability to persist in goal-directed behavior in the face of internal and/or external aversive experiences (Leyro et al., 2010; Simons & Gaher, 2005; . The construct of distress tolerance has emerged as an important correlate and predictor of psychopathology and risk behaviors including substance use-related problems Daughters et al., 2005) , bulimic symptoms (Anestis et al., 2007) , depression (Clen et al., 2011) , and borderline personality disorder (Bornovalova et al., 2011) . Distress tolerance has also recently been identified as a target for intervention suggesting that this construct may be malleable and amenable to treatment (Bornovalova et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2008; Macatee & Cougle, 2015) . Although distress tolerance has emerged as a clinically significant correlate of psychopathology, there remains limited research on the factors that contribute to individual differences in distress tolerance. The current study seeks to examine important components of distress tolerance that contribute to variation in the construct within an analogue sample to direct future research in clinical populations and inform research on distress tolerance as a target for intervention.
To better understand the basic mechanisms underlying distress tolerance it is first important to consider distress tolerance within its theoretical framework. Distress tolerance is considered a hierarchical construct that may differ based on the type of distress an individual experiences and the method used to assess tolerance (Bernstein et al., 2009; Leyro et al., 2010) . Leyro, Zvolensky, and Bernstein (2010) provide an extensive review of the various forms of distress commonly assessed, which span intolerance of physical aversive states, intolerance of ambiguity or uncertainty, intolerance of negative emotions, and intolerance of cognitive and psychological frustration. This review also differentiates between the perceived ability to tolerate distress, as assessed via self-report measures, and the actual ability to tolerate distress, as assessed via behavioral measures. Findings from multimethod studies on distress tolerance suggest that there are discrepancies between these forms (Leyro et al., 2010; McHugh et al., 2011) . There appear to be significant correlations among self-report indices of distress tolerance and among behavioral indices, but these correlations do not exist across methods . Although this discrepancy may be the result of inconsistency in the form of distress assessed by a particular measure (e.g., psychological frustration in the case of behavioral assessments and negative affect in the case of the distress tolerance scale; Simons & Gaher, 2005) , the lack of a correlation may be the result of discrepancies between an individual's perception of tolerance and her tolerance in the moment. Behavioral measures may provide a more objective index of an individual's ability to tolerate distress because they are less influenced by the effects of retrospective reporting (Gorin et al., 2001) .
Behavioral measures provide real-time assessments of distress tolerance making them optimal for examining the basic processes underlying distress tolerance. They also exemplify two key components of distress tolerance's operationalization. First, distress tolerance is frequently conceptualized using a negative reinforcement framework (Leyro et al., 2010; Trafton & Gifford, 2011) . Trafton and Gifford (2011) argue that distress tolerance is associated with the pursuit of negative reinforcement opportunities. Intolerance of distress predicts an individual terminating the task at the expense of a future reward to remove an aversive stimulus. In line with the process of negative reinforcement, removal of the aversive stimulus serves to reinforce this behavior and the intolerance of distress over time (Baker et al., 2004; Cooper, 1994; Cox & Klinger, 1988) . Behavioral measures reproduce this process and capture both the response to a stressor (i.e., how quickly someone ends the task) and how aversive an individual finds the stressor (i.e., self-report ratings of negative affect). The second component exemplified by behavioral measures is the conceptual difference between distress tolerance and related constructs. Distress tolerance is considered an adaptive trait that supports goal-oriented behavior in the presence of distress and is differentiated from experiential avoidance and disengagement coping . Whereas experiential avoidance and disengagement coping involve altering the aversive experience, tolerating distress involves withstanding without modifying the aversive experience . Unlike the behavioral response of perseveration or the persistence in activity that is harmful or lacking in reward (Leyro et al., 2010; distress tolerance is associated with opportunity for a reward; meaning that tolerating distress may be beneficial because it is in service of achieving a future goal. There may be unique processes underlying the tolerance of distress that are unrelated or function differently for the other coping methods of avoidance, disengagement coping, and perseveration.
Overall, behavioral distress tolerance measures, such as the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task (PASAT; Gronwall & Sampson, 1974; Lejuez et al., 2003) and the Mirror-tracing Persistence Task (Daughters et al., 2005; Matthews & Stoney, 1988) , model the traditional conceptualization of distress tolerance. Although, behavioral measures assess tolerance for psychological frustration, these tasks are associated with self-reported increases in frustration, stress, and negative affect (Krantz, Manuck, & Wing, 1986; Leyro et al., 2010; Matthews & Stoney, 1988) . This suggests that results from research using behavioral measures of distress tolerance may generalize to other forms of distress (e.g., negative affect). Finally, unlike self-report measures, behavioral tolerance is assessed in real time and not retrospectively; therefore, behavioral measures allow for the examination of other constructs that prospectively predict variation in distress tolerance as well as constructs that may interact with contextual factors to affect tolerance.
Impulsivity in the context of intense emotional states may be a promising predictor of individual differences in distress tolerance. Research indicates that individuals may act impulsively when experiencing acute changes in emotions because these emotions may drive actions while executive functioning is simultaneously inhibited (Lewis et al., 2004; Pessoa, 2009; Torres et al., 2013) . Trait urgency is considered a behavioral correlate of these underlying cognitive-affective processes of impulse control and this construct captures individual differences in the tendency to act rashly in the context of acute mood changes regardless of emotional valence. (Cyders & Smith, 2008; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) . Urgency is also considered to be a relatively stable trait within an individual, but is thought to be one particular facet of impulsive behavior. Individuals may differ on these facets in relatively stable ways-impulsivity in one domain may not be associated with impulsivity in another. However, higher levels of trait urgency, as opposed to other facets of impulsivity, may be associated with poorer behavioral distress tolerance because of the predisposition to act rashly when distressed.
Although urgency is one facet of impulsive behavior (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) it is conceptualized as a higher-order construct comprised of two lower-order factors, negative urgency and positive urgency. Both negative urgency and positive urgency refer to the tendency to act rashly while experiencing negative and positive emotional states, respectively Whiteside & Lynam, 2001 ). Both urgency factors are commonly assessed using self-report measures because of a lack of behavioral assessments; however, these measures show good reliability and predict actual risk behavior occurring during negative and positive mood states (Cyders & Smith, 2010) . These urgency traits also appear to be invariant across gender in their ability to predict future outcomes (Cyders, 2013) . Of these two factors, previous research has primarily examined the association between negative urgency and distress tolerance given that the experience of distress and/or negative mood is central to the operationalization of negative urgency (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001 ). Indeed, self-reported negative urgency appears to be associated with a poor ability to inhibit responses in the context of risk as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task, a behavioral measure of impulsivity (Billieux et al., 2010; Dolan, Bechara, & Nathan, 2008) . A limited amount of previous research has also examined the association between negative urgency and distress tolerance, and results indicate a moderate correlation, as well as unique and interactive predictive validity of both constructs for similar outcomes (Cougle et al., 2011; Kelly et al., 2014; Peterson et al., 2014; Weitzman et al., 2011; Wray et al., 2012) . However, negative urgency and positive urgency appear to be highly correlated Pang et al., 2014; Spillane, Smith, & Kahler, 2010) and load well onto a single factor of urgency (Cyders & Smith, 2008) . Therefore, escalations in negative urgency and positive urgency may in fact be indicative of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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escalations in the encompassing trait of urgency, and the previous findings in regard to negative urgency and distress tolerance may also apply to positive urgency. Such a relation has yet to be explored, and the ability of positive urgency to function in a similar manner as negative urgency might suggest that urgency, or rash action to acute changes in emotions regardless of valence, may be one mechanism underlying behavioral distress tolerance. Though there is some evidence to suggest that urgency may be associated with distress tolerance, one important limitation to the extant research examining both trait urgency and distress tolerance is the exclusion of behavioral measures of distress tolerance. No work to date has examined how urgency and behavioral measures of distress tolerance relate. This issue is relevant to the extent that current research does not fully explore how one construct impacts the other and how these processes proceed to drive immediate behavior (e.g., avoidant coping strategies). Because urgency appears to be a cognitive-behavioral trait (Billieux et al., 2010; Dolan et al., 2008 ) that predicts rash actions under stress, it may directly predict the inability to tolerate distress in the moment. Specifically, for some individuals, a tendency to act rashly may undermine their ability to tolerate distress and persist in goaldirected behavior in the context of rapid changes in negative affect which may be assessed more effectively with an experimental task rather than via a self-report measure eliciting one's perception of the ability to tolerate distress globally. Moreover, although there may be important interactive effects between the two constructs (Cougle et al., 2011; Peterson et al., 2014) , urgency may ultimately be contributing to low distress tolerance; however, no studies have yet examined this possibility.
While urgency may directly predict the ability to tolerate distress, it may also indirectly affect distress tolerance through its association with an individual's tendency to experience acute changes in affect during a distressing event. Although behavioral manifestations of urgency arise from acute changes in affect, individuals high in trait urgency may also be more likely to experience larger changes in affect in response to an event. Billieux and colleagues (2010) hypothesized a theoretical relationship between trait negative urgency, in particular, and emotional reactivity because of reported associations between lower self-reported inhibitory control and emotional reactivity (Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 2008) . There may be a bidirectional relationship between urgency and affect reactivity, individuals reporting high urgency may continuously respond to affect by seeking alternative or avoidant behaviors and never learn adaptive coping strategies to decrease the affect. Empirical research suggests that more intense and frequent negative affect is associated with maladaptive coping strategies such as substance use (Colder & Chassin, 1997; Swendsen et al., 2000; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007) and bulimic behaviors such as binging and purging (Berg et al., 2013; Smyth et al., 2007) . Therefore, urgency may also predict a greater likelihood of experiencing acute changes in affect. Trait measures of urgency may significantly predict affective reactivity to a psychologically frustrating task, such as that experienced during behavioral assessments of distress tolerance. This affective reactivity may then undermine adaptive distress tolerance and lead to engagement in negative reinforcing opportunities and the tendency to end a goaloriented task. Research on emotion and impulsive behavior suggests intense emotion can shift focus to the immediate task versus long-term goals as well as interfere with making decisions (Bechara, 2004; Cyders & Smith, 2008; Davidson, 2003; Dolan, 2008) . One study by Cyders and Coskunpinar (2010) found that risk behavior in the context of negative mood was associated with both the frequency and intensity of negative affect. Ultimately affect reactivity associated with urgency may explain the relationship between urgency and distress tolerance.
In summary, both reactivity to a stressor and an inability to inhibit a rash response to the stressor may predict individual differences in the ability to tolerate distress. The current study sought to examine the direct and indirect relationship between urgency and distress tolerance via change in negative affect in response to a stressful computer task. The study specifically examined whether both negative urgency and positive urgency were related to behavioral distress tolerance via affective reactivity to investigate whether trait urgency, regardless of valence, contributes to distress tolerance. Consistent with requirements for a meditational model, urgency was assessed before the stressful event and the distress tolerance task. Negative affect was self-reported before and after a stressful practice portion of the distress tolerance task, and following this assessment, distress tolerance was measured via persistence on the final level of the task. Ultimately, we hypothesized that urgency would directly predict distress tolerance, but that those individuals higher in urgency would also experience greater changes in negative affect during a distressing task and that this change in affect would then predict lower distress tolerance as indexed by faster quit times.
Method Participants
The current study utilized data from a larger project examining the utility of a behavioral assessment of negative reinforcement based risk taking (MacPherson et al., 2012) . The current constructs were included in the original study to examine factors underlying negative reinforcement based processes such as distress tolerance. There were 163 freshmen who were recruited from a large public university via flyers posted around campus. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 19-years old. The age criterion was chosen for the parent study to limit age-related variation in risktaking behaviors within the sample. The only additional inclusion criteria were English proficiency and no hearing impairment because of an audio component of the task. The current sample consisted of 161 participants (two participants were dropped from analyses because they were missing data on the variables of interest). The average age of the participants was 18.14 (SD ϭ 0.38) and 49.4% of the sample was female. Seventy-one percent identified as White, 13% as Black, 15.4% as Asian, 6.7% as other, and 8% as Hispanic or Latino.
Procedure
Permission to conduct research was obtained from the University's Institutional Review Board. All study procedures were completed in a laboratory setting located on the university's campus. When participants arrived they were directed to a private room where they were given a detailed description of the study and provided informed consent. After consenting procedures, participants completed self-report questionnaires and computerized tasks This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Measures
Demographics. Participants completed a demographics questionnaire that assessed their age, gender, race, ethnicity, family income, parent's education, and current housing. These variables were examined as potential covariates in the model.
The Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, and Positive Urgency (UPPS-P) Impulsive Behavior Scale (Lynam, Smith, Cyders, Fischer, & Whiteside, 2007). Negative and positive urgency was assessed using the UPPS-P, which is a 52-item measure that consists of five subscales of impulsive behavior (Negative Urgency, Positive Urgency, Lack of Premeditation, Lack of Perseverance, and Sensation Seeking). The negative and positive urgency subscales were used in the current study because they assess impulsive action in relation to affect change (e.g., "When I am upset I often act without thinking" or "I tend to loose control when I am in a great mood"). Participants rate their agreement with each statement on the UPPS-P using a 4-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Negative urgency scores ranged from 12.00 to 42.00 (M ϭ 25.41, SD ϭ 6.81) and Cronbach's ␣ for the scale in the current sample was 0.87. Positive urgency scores ranged from 14.00 to 54.00 (M ϭ 25.68, SD ϭ 8.67) and Cronbach's ␣ for the scale in the current sample was 0.89.
Computerized Mirror-Tracing Persistence Task (MTPT-C; Strong et al., 2003).
The MTPT-C was used to measure distress tolerance, or as often defined when using a behavioral task, persistence on goal directed behavior while experiencing stress. The MTPT-C requires participants to trace geometric shapes by moving a red dot on the screen via the use of a computer mouse. However, the red dot moves in the opposite direction of the physical movement of the mouse to simulate tracing the shape in a mirror. When tracing the shape, the red dot is returned to the starting point on the figure if participants trace outside the lines or stop tracing for more than 2 seconds. Both of these violations also result in a buzzing noise, which adds to the distressing nature of the task. Participants were provided with two practice rounds (lasting 1 min each) before starting the final, and most difficult shape (i.e., a star lasting 7 minutes). Participants rated current positive and negative affect before and after the practice rounds, which assessed individual changes in affect before distress tolerance was measured. The specific methods for measuring negative affect are described below. Before starting the final round, participants were informed that they could quit the last round at any time; however, quitting would result in a lower score and participants were told that they would receive more compensation for a higher score. All participants were guaranteed $10 for participation, but they could earn up to an additional $10 for their performance on the MTPT-C. Participants were able to quit the task by pressing any key. The time until a participant quit the final round was recorded in seconds and used as an index for distress tolerance or persistence. Because of the potential effect of skill level on the mirror-tracing persistence task, the version of the MTPT-C used in the present study used a titrating procedure to control for differences in performance . Specifically, the version used in the current study titrated the width of the lines comprising the star. Participants who made more errors during the practice round completed the final round using a star with a wider width as compared with participants with few errors on the practice round. Specifically, all participants started with a width of 30 units, which was titrated to a minimum of 10 units or up to a maximum of 24 units. The width of the final round was 15.8 units on average. Therefore, errors on the final round are reduced as a function of line width because a wider line results in fewer errors-decreasing differential contribution of line width to task termination. Finally, time to quit was scored as a continuous variable. Past empirical work using behavioral measures of distress tolerance have used this continuous index of persistence because it provides greater variability in scores as compared with the dichotomous method of a quit versus no quit index (Daughters et al., 2009; Gratz et al., 2007) . The current data was not skewed that allowed for the use of a continuous variable (skew ϭ Ϫ0.14, SE ϭ 0.19). In the current sample, average time until a participant quit the task was 248.77 seconds (SD ϭ 140.27) out of a total of 420 seconds.
The MTPT-C evidences convergent validity with other behavioral distress tolerance measures, such as the PASAT , with scores on both measures highly correlated (Bornovalova et al., 2012) . The MTPT-C has been shown to induce distress in clinical and nonclinical samples, and additionally, it is associated with higher risk behavior and psychopathology (Daughters et al., 2005; Nock & Mendes, 2008) .
Negative affect was determined by the participants' ratings of negative affect from two separate time points during the task. First, participants were asked to rate how mad, frustrated, upset, embarrassed, and nervous they were before any exposure to the task (e.g., practice rounds) and then asked to rate the same negative affect variables after the practice round, but before the final round (i.e., criterion variable). Items are rated on a 150-point Visual Analog Scale (0 ϭ none, 150 ϭ extreme; Brown et al., 2002) . This scale of negative affect has been shown to have acceptable reliability (␣ ϭ .86; Daughters et al., 2009) , and in the current sample Cronbach's ␣ for the pretask negative affect ratings was 0.82 and ␣ for the posttask ratings was 0.87.
Data Analysis Plan
All hypotheses were developed before data analysis and were examined using data from a study designed to investigate theoretical associations among constructs relevant to negative reinforcement processes (MacPherson et al., 2012) . All variables were examined for skew, normality, and outliers before data analysis. Bivariate correlations between negative urgency, positive urgency, distress tolerance, and change in negative affect were examined. Additionally, correlations between distress tolerance and relevant demographic variables (i.e., gender, ethnicity, race, and income) were examined given previous reports that demographic variables may act as moderators between distress tolerance and psychopathology or risk outcomes (Ali et al., 2015; Daughters et al., 2009) . Any significant correlation between distress tolerance and demographic variables would warrant inclusion of the demographic variable as a covariate in the final model. Similarly, correlations were examined between distress tolerance and other impulsivity facets on the UPPS-P. Although urgency was hypothesized a priori to predict distress tolerance, other theoretically relevant facets of This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
impulsivity, such as lack of perseverance, may similarly serve a predictive function for the ability to tolerate distress and terminate a goal-oriented task prematurely. Therefore, any impulsivity variables found to be significantly related to distress tolerance were also included in the model. A paired-samples t test was conducted using the negative affect ratings before and after the task as a manipulation check to ensure the task was distressing. To examine the main hypothesis of the study, a path model was tested in Mplus 6.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010) to examine whether change in negative affect mediated the relationship between negative and positive urgency and distress tolerance. Following recommendations by Preacher and Hayes (2008) , bootstrapping techniques were used to examine the indirect effect of urgency on distress tolerance via change in negative affect. Confidence intervals (CIs) around the estimate of the indirect effect that do not contain zero suggest that the indirect effect is significant. First, fit indices were examined to determine how well the model fit the data. The 2 statistic, the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) , the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973) , and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger, 1990) were examined. Model fit is considered acceptable when the 2 value is nonsignificant, values for the CFI and TLI are greater than .90 (Byrne, 1994; Hu & Bentler, 1999) and RMSEA values are less than 0.05 (Steiger, 1990) .
Results
Means, SDs, and the results of the bivariate correlations for the predictor and criterion variables are presented in Table 1 . There was no significant association between self-reported gender, ethnicity, race, or income and distress tolerance (all ps Ͻ 0.05); therefore, these variables were not included as covariates in the final model. Negative urgency and distress tolerance were significantly and negatively related (r ϭ Ϫ0.18, p ϭ .03). Both negative urgency, r ϭ .45, p ϭ .001 and distress tolerance, r ϭ Ϫ0.29, p ϭ .001 were correlated with posttask negative affect in the expected directions. Specifically, higher levels of negative affect following the stressor were associated with higher levels of negative urgency and shorter time to quit the MTPT-C. In addition to negative urgency, positive urgency was significantly associated with distress tolerance (r ϭ Ϫ0.22, p Ͻ .01). However, positive urgency was also significantly correlated with negative urgency (r ϭ .70, p Ͻ .001) to a stronger degree than any other impulsivity facet (correlation coefficients ranged from 0.23 to 0.27 for all other facets), which reflects similar findings in the extant literature Pang et al., 2014; Spillane, Smith, & Kahler, 2010) . A paired samples t test indicated a significant difference between pre and posttask ratings of negative affect (t(161) ϭ Ϫ15.39, p ϭ .001) with an average rating of 120.09 before and 291.57 after.
To examine our first hypothesis we examined a model of the indirect effect of negative urgency on distress tolerance through change in negative affect. Change in negative affect was indexed by posttask negative affect ratings when controlling for pretask ratings. This method for creating change scores accounts for baseline negative affect before the stressor as opposed to using difference scores, which only index amount of change. The initial test of model fit, suggested that the model had adequate fit to the observed data:
2 (df ϭ 1) ϭ 0.11, p ϭ .74, CFI ϭ 1.00, TLI ϭ 1.00, RMSEA ϭ 0.001 (90% CI [0.001-0.15]). There was a significant effect from negative urgency to posttask negative affect (␤ ϭ 6.14, p ϭ .001), when controlling for pretask negative affect, as well as a significant effect from posttask negative affect to distress tolerance (␤ ϭ Ϫ0.20, p ϭ .004). However, the direct effect of negative urgency on distress tolerance was not significant when including posttask negative affect controlling for pretask negative affect in the model (direct effect ϭ Ϫ1.21, p ϭ .46; Figure 1 ). The indirect effect of negative urgency on distress tolerance through change in negative affect during a distressing task was significant: indirect effect ϭ Ϫ1.25, SE ϭ 0.63, p ϭ .045; 95% CI [Ϫ2.48 to Ϫ0.03]. An effect size estimate, -squared (k 2 ) for the indirect effect was calculated using procedures outlined by Preacher and Kelley (2011) , and the k 2 value was 0.05 for the indirect effect. However, Preacher and Kelley (2011) urge caution when assigning qualifiers to the -squared value and the guidelines for interpretation may not be equivalent to other effect size estimates. In addition to -squared, we examined the ratio of the indirect effect to the total effect (P M ) as a second estimation of effect size. This resulted in a P M equal to 0.52, which represents how much of the effect of negative urgency on distress tolerance operates through a change in negative affect from zero (no effect) to 1 (all of the effect).
To examine whether positive urgency was also associated with distress tolerance we tested the same model with positive urgency This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
in place of negative urgency. Results of this analysis suggest that there was no significant direct effect of positive urgency on distress tolerance (direct effect ϭ Ϫ2.26, p ϭ .09), but there was a significant indirect effect of positive urgency on distress tolerance through a change in negative affect (indirect effect ϭ Ϫ0.68, SE ϭ 0.43, 95% CI [Ϫ1.79 to Ϫ0.06]; Figure 2 ). The effect size estimate of this significant indirect effect was 0.23, suggesting that less of the effect of positive urgency on distress tolerance operated through a change in negative affect. Finally, we examined whether negative urgency continued to indirectly predict distress tolerance through a change in negative affect when controlling for positive urgency. When examining both negative and positive urgency in the model, neither urgency factor significantly predicted distress tolerance suggesting that their overlapping variance cancelled out the unique predictive ability of either factor.
Discussion
We hypothesized that self-reported trait urgency, or the tendency to act rashly in the context of negative mood, would directly predict persistence on a behavioral measure of distress tolerance. We also hypothesized that there would be an indirect relationship between urgency and distress tolerance through a greater change in negative affect experienced in response to a stressor just before the task. Consistent with research using self-reported distress tolerance (Cougle et al., 2011; Kaiser et al., 2012) , we first found a significant inverse correlation between negative urgency and persistence on the task, suggesting that individuals who are higher in negative urgency show less persistence toward goal-directed behavior on a distressing task. However, the current findings suggest that this association is significantly mediated by a greater change in negative affect from pre to post stressor. In the final model, negative urgency predicted greater changes in negative affect in response to the stressful practice rounds of the MTPT-C and in turn, the intensity and change in negative affect predicted a poorer ability to persist at goal-directed behavior.
In addition to negative urgency, we found a significant inverse correlation between positive urgency and persistence on the distress tolerance task. Replacing positive urgency for negative urgency in the mediation model produced similar results, indicating that positive urgency also indirectly predicts behavioral distress intolerance through changes in negative affect. However, when including both positive urgency and negative urgency in the model, both subfactors of urgency failed to significantly predict a greater change in negative affect or distress tolerance. These results suggest that negative urgency and positive urgency may contribute to a high percentage of shared variance in distress tolerance and that the broad factor of urgency may better explain the results. Although negative urgency and positive urgency have been shown to have unique predictive abilities, results of a factor analysis also suggest that negative urgency and positive urgency load well onto a single factor of urgency (Cyders & Smith, 2008) . Therefore, individuals may exhibit a general predisposition to rash action during intense emotional states reflected in their reports of both positive and negative urgency. While no single measure of urgency exists, we discuss our results in regards to trait urgency and differentiate between negative urgency and positive urgency where applicable.
Although we hypothesized that urgency would directly predict distress tolerance because of an inability to inhibit prepotent responses during a stressful task (Billieux et al., 2010) , these results suggest that the association between these two constructs may be mediated by reactivity to a stressor. Knowing that an individual often acts impulsively in the context of acute changes in mood does not solely predict less persistence on goal-oriented behavior. Rather a greater change in negative affect during an aversive event may be a critical factor underlying distress tolerance. These results fit the operationalization of distress tolerance such that tolerance does not only depend on a tendency to act impulsively, but that the distress, and specifically reaction to distress, plays an important role and may ultimately lead to early termination of goal-focused behavior. Additionally, these findings are in line with research on the effects of emotion on behavioral control and decision-making (Slovic et al., 2004; Yamasaki et al., 2002) , suggesting that emotional reactivity may negatively affect effortful control. Furthermore, one study by Nock and colleagues (2008) found that a self-report measure of emotional reactivity was significantly associated with poorer inhibitory control and attention.
These results also suggest that trait urgency may be significantly associated with a tendency toward emotional reactivity, which has only previously been discussed theoretically (Billieux et al., 2010; Cyders & Smith, 2008) . Current theoretical models of urgency focus on the propensity to act rashly in response to acute changes in affect (Cyders & Smith, 2008) , but focus less on the frequency with which an individual experiences intense changes in emotions. Yet, it appears that individuals may not only be more impulsive in these settings but also more likely to experience greater changes in affect. Billieux and colleagues (2010) suggest that individuals higher in negative urgency may be more reactive to negative affect and experience distress more intensely. The current findings imply that this may in fact be the case, and that trait urgency may be associated with a tendency to report more intense negative emotions. Although Billieux and colleagues (2010) did not discuss this relation in regards to positive urgency, the current results seem to suggest that positive urgency may also be significantly associated with greater changes in negative affect. Although these results may seem counterintuitive, they may suggest that trait urgency is associated with greater emotional reactivity regardless of valence. Because urgency appears to represent an affective-cognitive pro- This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
cess, trait urgency may ultimately confer risk for a more intense experience of affect, which may over time undermine other adaptive behavioral processes. Given the recent focus on the potential for change in distress tolerance it is important to identify factors that affect individual differences in behavioral distress tolerance (Bornovalova et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2008; Macatee & Cougle, 2015) . These findings suggest that subjective aversiveness of a stressor (e.g., change in negative affect) significantly predicts the ability to tolerate distress and continue to persist when there is potential for a future reward. These findings provide support for the continued focus on decreasing acute negative affect in interventions targeting distress tolerance (Bornovalova et al., 2012; Brown et al., 2008; Macatee & Cougle, 2015) . These interventions promote the reduction of negative affect to reduce avoidance behaviors, increase distress tolerance, and ultimately decrease the likelihood of risky behaviors. Negative urgency, and possibly trait urgency more broadly, also uniquely impact behavioral distress tolerance. Higher levels of urgency may imply that individuals are either more prone to greater changes in negative affect as a trait-like phenomenon or individuals may typically attempt to avoid negative affect resulting in fewer adaptive emotion regulation strategies. More research is needed to distinguish the causal relationship between urgency and change in affect, but interventions aimed at distress tolerance could incorporate strategies focused on decreasing impulsive behavior as well as increasing affect regulation.
The current study assessed distress tolerance as it applies to the tolerance of psychological frustration, which may have important implications for the generalizability of the findings. Although completion of the task is associated with significant increases in negative affect and stress, suggesting that stress and affective systems may be affected by the task, these results may not apply to tolerance of physical stressors as well as other forms of distress such as discomfort and uncertainty (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Schmidt, Richey, & Fitzpatrick, 2006) . Urgency and a greater change in negative affect may not be significantly related to tolerance for physical discomfort such as the CO 2 challenge task . However, behavioral measures of distress tolerance appear to have good predictive validity across various outcomes (e.g., substance use, disordered eating, and emotion regulation in borderline personality disorder). This suggests that tolerance for psychological frustration may be implicated in a number of maladaptive behaviors, and that the current relationship examined using behavioral measures of distress tolerance may affect real world behavior. Finally, it remains unknown whether these findings apply to self-report assessments of distress tolerance since behavioral measures may assess context-specific tolerance. Current research suggests that mediators are important to consider when examining correlates of self-report distress tolerance, because perceived or trait-like distress tolerance may affect other processes that indirectly affect outcomes of interest (Farris, Zvolensky, Otto, & Leyro, 2015) .
In considering the findings, a few limitations should be noted. Although measurement of the variables of interest was consistent with mediation in that change in negative affect was measured in vivo and before the index of distress tolerance, the study was still cross-sectional in nature. Future research is needed to determine if trait urgency indicates that individuals are more prone to experience changes in negative affect or that urgency predicts avoidant strategies, which results in greater changes because of fewer coping strategies. Future research on negative and positive urgency should also examine their shared and independent predictive abilities to determine the extent to which they reflect two separate traits or one broad trait. The study was also conducted in a sample of university students and these results are not necessarily representative of how the constructs may manifest in clinical samples or across different ages. Typically, urgency and distress tolerance are studied in relation to clinical disorders such as substance dependence Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2007) , and eating disorders (Anestis et al., 2007; Fischer & Smith, 2008) . Finally, the study did not examine how these processes are associated to maladaptive or risky behaviors. Although urgency is significantly related to distress tolerance through an increase in negative affect, it is unclear whether this relationship results in an increased likelihood to report risk behavior or other psychopathology.
A few strengths should also be noted. First, this was the first study to examine the association between negative and positive urgency and a behavioral measure of distress tolerance. The study found a correlation between negative urgency and the MTPT-C as previously seen with negative urgency and the self-report Distress Tolerance Scale (DTS; Simons & Gaher, 2005) The correlation coefficient, r ϭ Ϫ0.18, p Ͻ .05 was smaller than correlations using self report, which ranged from 0.39 to 0.55 (Cougle et al., 2011; Kaiser et al., 2012; Kelly et al., 2014; Peterson et al., 2014; Weitzman et al., 2011) . A similar correlation was also seen between positive urgency and behavioral distress tolerance, r ϭ Ϫ0.22, p Ͻ .05, which has not been examined to date. Although these differences in the magnitude of the correlation may be because of method variance, they also suggest a qualitative difference in the assessment of distress tolerance . This further suggests that behavioral distress tolerance may be dependent on states or context and that similar effects for self-report and behavioral measures may not be expected. Finally, these findings point to promising components for distress tolerance interventions that could increase their overall efficacy.
Ultimately the results of this study suggest that urgency may be related to distress intolerance through both the propensity toward poor ability to inhibit a prepotent response as well as greater intensity in negative affect. Urgency appears to be a trait variable that predicts risk for the intensity of negative affect either through a tendency for greater reactivity to affect or through a relation to poor recruitment of emotion regulation strategies. Individuals who are higher in urgency may exhibit an inability to tolerate distress and persist at goal-directed behavior. This relationship may be especially important in clinical populations because distress tolerance has been shown to predict a number of risk behaviors and mental health symptoms. If urgency and distress tolerance are related through the tendency to experience greater changes in negative affect, this may suggest generally poorer emotion regulation. This could negatively impact clinical disorders like substance use disorder because such maladaptive coping strategies may promote initiation, maintenance and relapse. The relationship between urgency and distress tolerance may confer general risk for poor emotion regulation, which could exacerbate or maintain clinical symptoms. Future studies should examine the concurrent development of urgency and distress tolerance as well as investigate the effects of urgency on negative affect intensity over time.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
